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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT -
SECTION 38 PROPERTY - BUILDINGS
Arne Thirupl
The investment tax credit, designed to stimulate modernization and
expansion of the nation's productive facilities,2 is a major business tax in-
centive. Currently, the credit is ten percent of the qualified investment in
new and used section 38 property. Limitations, carryover, and recapture
rules are found with the basic provisions in sections 38 and 46 through 50
of the Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter referred to as the Code).3
Section 38 property is generally defined in section 48 (a) (1) of the
Code and may be summarized to include depreciable property with an
estimated useful life of three years or more which is:
1. Tangible personal property.
2. Other tangible property (excluding buildings and structural
components thereof) if-
A. used as an integral part of certain qualifying activities, or
B. a storage or research facility used in connection with the same
qualifying activities.
3. Elevators and escalators. 4
The balance of section 48 contains exceptions and qualifications to the
above general definition.5 Distinguishing between buildings, which do not
1. 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g. 59 T.C. 122 (1972).
2. CONF. REP. No. 2508, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3732 (1962).
3. INT. REv. CoDE OF 1954, §§ 38, 46-50.
4. INT. R.y. CODE OF 1954, § 48(a)(1) provides:
in general.-Except as provided in this subsection, the term "section 38
property" means-
(A) tangible personal property or(B) other tangible property (not including a building and its structural
components) but only if such property-
(i) is used as an integral part of manufacturing, production, or ex-
traction or of furnishing transportation, communications, elec-
trical energy, gas, water, or sewage disposal services, or
(ii) constitutes a research facility used in connection with any of
the activities referred to in clause (i), or
(iii) constitutes a facility used in connection with any of the activ-
ities referred to in clause (i) for the bulk storage of fungible
commodities (including commodities in a liquid or gaseous
state), or
(C) elevators and escalators, but only if-
(i) the construction, reconstruction, or erection of the elevator or
escalator is completed by the taxpayer after June 30, 1963, or
(ii) the elevator or escalator is acquired after June 30, 1963, and the
original use of such elevator or escalator commences with the
taxpayer and commences after such date.
Such term includes only property with respect to which depreciation (or
amortization in lieu of depreciation) is allowable and having a useful
life (determined as of the time such property is placed in service) of
3 years or more.
5. See, e.g., INT. Ray. CoDE oF 1954, §§ 48(a)(3) (exclusion of property used
to furnish permanent lodging), 48(a)(6) (certain livestock previously excluded now
eligible for investment credit).
[Vol. 41
1
Walton: Walton: Investment Tax Credit--Section 38 Property
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1976
RECENT CASES
qualify for the investment credit, and other structures, which may qualify,6
has proven to be one of the most troublesome problems encountered in
applying the investment credit.
In Arne Thirup7 the taxpayers claimed an investment credit for in-
vestments made in a greenhouse used in their business of growing and
selling cut flowers. The greenhouse was a completely enclosed structure,
200 feet wide by 400 feet long. It was constructed of a wooden frame with
fiberglass panels for a roof and walls. There was no floor; the flowers grew
directly from the enclosed soil. The greenhouse was designed to supply a
controlled environment and had built-in automatic temperature, humidity,
watering, liquid fertilizing, and carbon dioxide systems. The fiberglass wall
and roof panels were of a special type designed to diffuse the sunlight for
better growing conditions. Also, windows in the roof opened and closed
automatically to coordinate the external and internal temperature and
humidity. Within the greenhouse, the taxpayers' employees performed
such tasks as turning and fertilizing the soil, planting, pulling weeds,
spraying chemicals, pruning, and harvesting. On occasion, some of the
employees ate lunch and took work breaks inside the greenhouse, although
no formal facilities were provided for this. It was estimated that approxi-
mately one-half of the total work hours were spent inside the greenhouse.
The Commissioner, conceding that the greenhouse was "other tangible
property .. .used as an integral part of production" within section 48
(a) (1) (B) (i) of the Code, contended that the greenhouse was a building
and therefore ineligible for the investment credit.8 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the Tax Court and found
the greenhouse to be section 38 property eligible for the investment
credit.9
The "appearance test" (because it looks like a building, it must ipso
facto be a building) was rejected by the court of appeals in Thirup.1°
This test is derived from legislative history'! and finds additional support
in the Treasury Regulations, which provide: "The term 'building' gen-
erally means any structure or edifice enclosing a space within its walls,
6. For a non-building structure to be eligible for the investment credit, it
must be used as an integral part of manufacturing, production, or extraction,
or as an integral part of furnishing transportation, communication, electrical en-
ergy, gas, water, or sewage disposal services by a person engaged in the business
of furnishing the same. INT. REV. ConF- or 1954, § 48(a)(1)(B)(i) (emphasis added).
A research or storage facility will qualify if it is used in connection with any of
the foregoing activities. INT. RIv. CODE or 1954, § 48(a) (1) (B) (ii), (iii) (emphasis
added). It is possible that a non-building structure could qualify as tangible per-
sonal property and not be subject to the question whether it is other tangible prop-
erty used in a prescribed activity. See note 38 and accompanying text infra.
7. 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974), revg 59 T.C. 122 (1972).
8. Id at 917.
9. Id. at 920.
10. Id. at 918.
11. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1962); S. REP. No. 1881,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1962).
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and usually covered by a roof. . .. "12 It is clear, however, that courts have
generally concluded that certain structures, although resembling a build-
ing in appearance, are not to be considered such for purposes of defining
section 38 property.1 3 This is particularly true where the issue is whether
the structure is a building or a storage facility, as opposed to a building
versus a non-storage facility.14 Illustrative is Robert E. Catron,15 where
the Tax Court analyzed the apparent contradiction between the broad
definition of "building" in the Regulations and the eligibility of storage
facilities as provided in section 48. It noted that a storage facility would
not qualify if it were also a building and that it was difficult to imagine
a storage facility that would not fit within the Regulations' definition of
a building. The court refused to attribute to Congress such a "nugatory
provision" and rejected the appearance test. 16 Similarly, the Commissioner
has, when presented with the building versus storage facility issue, fre-
quently refused to apply the appearance test.' 7 The Thirup decision is
significant because it is one of the first decisions rejecting the appearance
test where the question is whether a structure is a building or a non-storage
facility.18
A different test more frequently applied by the courts is a "function"
or "use" test. Like the appearance test, the function test is derived from
legislative history' 9 and finds additional support in the Regulations.2 0
This test limits the broad scope of the appearance test and states that a
building is generally a structure with walls and a roof which also pro-
vides ". . . for example, . . . shelter or housing, or . . . working, office,
parking, display, or sales space."2' 1 The function test was first developed
in storage facility cases 22 and has only recently been applied in non-
12. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1972).
13. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263
(CL Cl. 1974); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258
(6th Cir. 1974); Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306
(1968). But see Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C. 113 (1972). Sunnyside Nurseries was a
companion case to Thirup in the Tax Court and was also appealed to the Ninth
Circuit, but the appeal was dismissed for failure to prosecute.
14. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263
(Ct. CI. 1974) (warehouses for aging bourbon whiskey held storage facilities);
Brown &c Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir.
1974) (warehouses for aging tobacco held storage facilities).
15. 50 T.C. 306 (1968).
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 365, 1972-2 Cum. BuLL. 8; Rev. Rul. 359, 1971-2 CuM.
BuLL. 62; Rev. Rul. 122, 1968-1 CuM. BULL. 10.
18. See also Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974). The Commissioner has
ignored the appearance test in at least one notable instance. See Rev. Rul 209,
1968-1 Cum. BuLL. 16 (appearance test ignored by the Commissioner with result-
ant classification of craneway structure as a building).
19. H.R. REP. No. 1447, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. A18 (1962); S. Rn'. No. 1881,
87th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1962).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1972).
21. Id.
22. See Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct.
Cl. 1974); Brown Sc Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258
[Vol. 41
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storage facility cases.23 Standards for applying the function test were
initially announced in Revenue Ruling 66-89 (5) and provide that a struc-
ture is not a "building" if: (1) the structure cannot be reasonably adapted
to other uses, and (2) the structure provides only storage space, but not
work space.24
The inquiry whether the structure is reasonably adaptable to alterna-
tive uses focuses on the economic and physical practicability of conversion.
The cost of converting the structure to an alternative use is a factor only
recently mentioned in the cases and, standing alone, may not be very per-
suasive. 25 A showing by the taxpayer that the structure was specially de-
signed to accomplish a particular qualifying activity alone may be enough
to satisfy this standard.28 Where, however, the structure has not been used
exclusively for that activity or is available for multiple uses, then, notwith-
standing a showing of special design, the structure may not qualify as
section 38 property.27 In Central Citrus Company28 "sweet rooms" were
used solely for storing fruit in a controlled atmosphere. Because of the
special design and equipment systems inolved, the Tax Court held that
these structures were not reasonably adaptable to alternative uses. In
Palmer Olson29 quonset-type structures were specially designed for grain
storage. One of the structures had been used by the taxpayer as a machine
shed and the others were used for grain storage only about ninety percent
of the year. The Tax Court concluded that these structures were available
and adaptable for alternative uses and consequently not eligible section 38
property.
The work aspect of the function test states that a structure may qualify
as a storage facility if the only human activity performed therein is
activity incidental to the storage function, and if the structure does not
provide general work space.3 0 In applying the work aspect portion of the
(6th Cir. 1974); Central Citrus Co., 58 T.C. 365 (1972); Palmer Olson, 29 T.C.
Mem. 1367 (1970); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968).
23. See Arne Thirup, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'g 59 T.C. 122 (1972);
Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974).
24. Rev. Rul. 89, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 7, modified in other respects, Rev.
Rul. 222, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 17.
25. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258(6th Cir. 1974); Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974); Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122(1972), rev'd, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974).
26. See, e.g., Central Citrus Co., 58 T.C. 365 (1972); Adolph Coors Co., 27
T.C. Mem. 1351 (1968); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968). See also Melvin
Satrum, 62 T.C. 413 (1974) (a non-storage facility case).
27. See Palmer Olson, 29 T.C. Mem. 1367 (1970); cf. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974).
28. 58 T.C. 365 (1972).
29. 29 T.C. Mem. 1367 (1970).
30. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. Cl.
1974); Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968); see Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974); William K. Coors, 60 T.C.
368 (1973).
To qualify for the investment credit, a storage facility must be used for the
1976]
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function test, the Tax Court has been inclined to characterize as a "build-
ing" structures in which a "substantial number of [people are] frequently
and regularly occupied." 3 ' Thirup, however, joins the other appellate
court decisions on this issue and makes it clear that it is the nature of
the work activity, rather than the amount of work, that is determinative.3 2
The policy in tolerating work activity incidental to the storage function-
e.g., moving a product in and out of the storage facility, is consistent with
section 48, for to do otherwise would disqualify most storage facilities.33
Thirup extended the function test to non-storage facilities8 4 and may
have confused the otherwise consistent development of a building's defini-
tion. The function test, based on sound policy, was developed to dis-
tinguish between a building and a storage facility. Application of this test
in non-storage facility cases seems unwarranted in light of clear legislative
history contemplating a broad definition of "building." This is not to say
that the ultimate decision in Thirup was erroneous, only that the rationale
was faulty.
The Regulations provide two express exceptions to the definition of
a building, 5 either of which was potentially applicable in Thirup. The
term "building" does not include a structure which is essentially an item
of machinery or equipment.3 6 Brick kilns3 7 and refrigerator-freezer struc-
tures8s would be included under this exception.
bulk storage of fungible commodities. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 48(a)(l)(B)(iii).
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(5)(ii) (1972).
31. Sunnyside Nurseries, 59 T.C. 113, 122 (1972). See also Melvin Satrum,
62 T.C. 413 (1974); Arne Thirup, 59 T.C. 122 (1972), rev'd, 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir.
1974).
32. 508 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1974), revg 59 T.C. 122 (1972). The Thirup court
stated:
We find the distinction based on the amount of human activity un-
persuasive. The proper inquiry, which goes to the nature of the employee
activity inside the structure, is "whether the structures provide working
space for the employees that is more than merely incidental to the prin-
cipal function or use of the structure."
Id. at 919. (emphasis in original-citations omitted). See also Brown-Forman Dis-
tillers Corp. v. United States, 499 F.2d 1263 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 1258 (6th Cir. 1974).
88. See Robert E. Catron, 50 T.C. 306 (1968) (citing Rev. Rul. 68-138 where
the Commissioner held moving potatoes in and out of storage did not disqualify
the storage facility).
34. See also Melvin Satrum, 62 T.C. 418 (1974) (applying the function test
to an egg producing facility).
85. "Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1)(i), (ii) (1972).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1 (e)(1)(i) (1972).
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1) (1972). See also Rev. Rul. 557, 1969-2 Cum.
BULL. 8 (wood drying kilns).
88. Rev. Rul. 489, 1971-2 CuM. BULL. 64. If an item of property is within
this exception, it might properly be characterized as tangible personal property,
and as such it would qualify as section 38 property without regard to a qualifying
activity. Compare INT. REV. ConE oF 1954, § 48(a)(1)(A) with INT. Rtv. CODE or
1954, § 48(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii), (iii). See also note 6 supra. However, the Regulations
provide that tangible personal property does not include "inherently permanent"
structures. See Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(c) (1972). The appropriate definitional subpart
[Vol. 41
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The second exception is for "special purpose structures." The Regula-
tions state that if the structure houses equipment used as an integral part
of a qualifying activity and if the use of the structure is so closely related
to the use of that equipment that the structure can be expected to be
replaced contemporaneously with the equipment, then the structure is
excepted from the definition of a building and is eligible for the invest-
ment credit.89 Factors enumerated in the Regulations indicating that a
structure is within this exception are: (1) that ' the structure is specially
designed to provide for the stress and other demands of the equipment
housed therein, and (2) that the structure could not be economically used
for other purposes. 40
There is little "case law elaborating either exception.4 1 One interest-
ing example of a "special purpose structure" is a 1966 Revenue Ruling
where the Commissioner ruled that a unitary hog raising facility did not
qualify for the investment credit.42 An elliptical steel structure housed
automated systems for the farrowing, feeding, and raising of hogs. The
equipment housed within the structure included automatic feeders, water-
ers, and heat system, special airflow units, slatted flooring for sewage dis-
posal, space heaters for farrowing, and movable pens and partitions. The
Commissioner ruled that special design alone was not controlling to ex-
cept the structure from classification as a building.
However, in 1971, while considering statutory language to limit stor-
age facilities to those storing fungible goods in bulk, the Senate Finance
Committee Report clarified the fact that the term building is not in-
tended to include "special purpose structures." The Report used as an
example of such a structure a unitary system for raising hogs and specifi-
cally concluded that such a structure would be eligible for the investment
credit.43 Considering the external shell of the structure as merely a way
of tying together the equipment systems, the Senate report stated: "There
is no other practical use for the structure and it can ... be expected to be
used only so long as the equipment it houses is used."
44
of section 48 for an item of property which is "inherently permanent," yet within
the equipment or machinery exception to a building, is unclear. But cf. Rev. Rul.
489, 1971-2 Cum. BuLL. 64; Rev. Rul. 557, 1969-2 Cum. BuL. 3.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1)(ii) (1972). The Regulations previously provided
that the structure must be replaced contemporaneously with the equipment. Treas.
Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1)(ii) (1964).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(1)(ii) (1972).
41. See Walton Mills, Inc., 31 T.C. Mem. 75 (1972); Adolph Coors Co. 27
T.C. Mem. 1351 (1968). The Commissioner has generally applied a narrow inter-
pretation of these exceptions. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 281, 1973-2 Cum. BuLL. 8; Rev.
Rul. 398, 1972-2 Cum. BULL. 9. For examples of structures falling within the first
exception, see Rev. Rul. 489, 1971-2 Cmtr. Burt. 64; Rev. Rul. 557, 1969-2 Cums.
BuL. 3. For examples of structures within the second exception, see Rev. Rul. 223,
1971-1 Cum. BuLL. 117; Rev. Rul. 104, 1971-1 Cum. BuL.. 5; Rev. Rul. 412, 1969-2
GuM. BuLL. 2.
42. Rev. Rul. 329, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 16.
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Similarly, the greenhouse in Thirup could have been analogized to
the hog raising facility in the Senate report. The greenhouse contained
environmental control systems used as an integral part of a qualifying
activity and was so closely related to the use of that equipment that it
might be expected to be used only so long as that equipment was used.
No doubt -the greenhouse was specially designed to accommodate the
equipment systems and further factual inquiry would probably have led
to the conclusion that it had no .economically practical alternative use.
In summary, it is, essential to keep in mind that there are several
-separate and distinct approaches available to avoid the "building'! label:
(1) the two exceptions to the Regulation's definition of a building-
classification as machinery or equipment, and "special purpose struc-
tures;" and ,(2): the ,statutory exclusion for storage facilities.4  In certain
:respects, the standards for applying these different approaches are .similar.
:For example, the factual considerations under the Regulation's exception
for "special purpose structures" closely approximate those of the. alterna-
tive use aspect of the function test used in storage facility cases.40 Con-
fusion may easily, result from this similarity unless careful examination is
made of the context in which such phrases as "special design" and ."al-
ternative use" are employed. Additionally, in attempting to avoid the
"building" label, a critical distinction must be observed. The work aspect
of the function test is a releyant .consideration only in storage facility
cases and should .not be a factor in a non-storage facility case, as it was
in Thirup. The,,legislative intent will-be more accurately carried out if
this distinction is noted and respected.47
GAmRETr W. WALTON
45. A literal reading of section 48(a)(1)(B) indicates that only those storage
facilities which are not also buildings are eligible section 38 property. Howeyer, as
noted, the courts have contracted the otherwise broad definition of "building"
-where it conflicts with the statutory provision making, certain storage facilities
eligible for the investment credit. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
46. Compare text accompanying notes 39-40 supra with text accompanying
notes 25-29 supra.
47. A word of caution is appropriate. The scope of this note is confined to
particular aspects of the definition of the term "building" as that term is used
in defining section 38 property. The complex definitional scheme of section 38
property is thoroughly integrated, with individual definitional subparts interde-
pendent upon others. As a consequence, expansion of an individual definitional
subpart will result in contraction of others. Before relying on a particular aspect
of this scheme, careful examination of the whole is necessary.
[Vol. 41
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